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Abstract: In this article, we introduce the “Campbell Paradigm” as a novel variant of Rosenberg and Hovland’s (1960) tripartite model of
attitudes. The Campbell Paradigm is based on a highly restricted measurement model that speaks of a compensatory relation between a
person’s latent attitude and the costs that come with any specific behavior. It overcomes the overarching weakness of the original tripartite
model (i.e., its relative irrelevance for actual behavior) and offers a parsimonious explanation for behavior. Even though this seems attractive,
we also discuss why the paradigm has not gained momentum in the 50 years since it was originally proposed by Donald T. Campbell. To
demonstrate the paradigm’s suitability even when implemented with an unrefined instrument in a domain where it has not been used
previously, we apply the paradigm to a classic data example from attitude research from the 1984 US presidential election to account for the
electorate’s voting intentions and actual voting behaviors.
Keywords: attitudes, attitude-behavior consistency, attitude measurement, tripartite model, Campbell Paradigm
According to Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2002), the
science of behavior is progressively missing its target
because “. . . studies on [actual] behavior are dwindling
rapidly. . .” (p. 396). The situation is not any different in atti-
tude research, which comprises the third main cluster of
mental (i.e., inherently psychological) constructs after intel-
lectual abilities and personality traits. In attitude research,
behavior-explanation models (e.g., the theory of planned
behavior; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005) dominate much of con-
temporary behavioral research. In these behavior-explana-
tion models, “. . . attitude . . . is . . . [typically] one of many
factors that influence behavior” (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980,
p. 26). However, using such multifactorial models to
explain behavior implies only a fractional, often feeble
(and, at most, inconsistent) attitude-behavior relation. The
sound measurement of attitudes, by contrast, demands a
substantial attitude-behavior relation because attitude mea-
surement entirely and unconditionally rests upon the link
between an attitude and some manifestations (i.e., observ-
able behavior).
The most common measurement model of (explicit) atti-
tudes is still the venerable tripartite model of attitudes by
Rosenberg and Hovland (1960; see also, e.g., Eagly & Chai-
ken, 1993). This tripartite model is a latent variable model
that describes the relation between a latent attitude and its
cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestations (see
Figure 1A). Next to its use as a measurement model for
individual attitudes, it also logically represents an account
of attitude-relevant individual behavior. In other words,
the very model used to establish an estimation of a latent
attitude also represents a behavior-explanation model
because it is intended to account for any kind of manifesta-
tion of an attitude (e.g., verbal responses in questionnaires,
facial expressions, and actual behavior).
Due to its limited relevance for overt behavior, scholars
have challenged the tripartite model as being problematic
and have proposed alternative measurement models of
individual attitudes (for overviews, see, e.g., Krosnick, Judd,
& Wittenbrink, 2005; Schwarz, 2008) – often without cor-
roborating the behavioral relevance of their alternative
propositions (see, e.g., Dalege et al., 2016).
As a scientific community, we should avoid perpetually
reinventing the wheel and with it fostering the degradation
of our methodological acuity. As an alternative, we offer a
promising variant of the venerable tripartite measurement
model. This variant is called the Campbell Paradigm; it is
named after Donald T. Campbell (1963), who had proposed
the original measurement principle on which it was based.
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In this article and for the first time, we explain why the
Campbell Paradigm can be viewed as a highly restricted
variant of the classical tripartite measurement model. But
not only can the Campbell Paradigm be applied to the mea-
surement of attitudes, as we will demonstrate, it also allows
one to parsimoniously explain and substantially predict
behavior. As we will not elaborate on the Campbell Para-
digm and its constituents in great detail here, we refer to
Kaiser, Byrka, and Hartig (2010) for such a comprehensive
account.
In the first part of our article, we will briefly summarize
the classical version of the tripartite model of attitudes. Sub-
sequently, we will describe the ways in which the Campbell
Paradigm represents a variant of the tripartite model and
explain why this paradigm has failed to gain momentum
as a foundation for the science of behavior over the more
than 50 years since it was suggested by Campbell. In the
second part of the article, we will apply the paradigm to
data from the 1984 US presidential election to account
for the voting intentions and voting behavior of the
electorate.
We chose these data for two reasons: first, because vot-
ing behavior is a classic example in attitude research (see,
e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981; Fishbein & Coombs, 1974),
and it offers an example that is distinct from all prior appli-
cations of the Campbell Paradigm, most of which have
been about environmental protection (see e.g., Kaiser
et al., 2010; Kaiser, Hartig, Brügger, & Duvier, 2013); sec-
ond, because the very same dataset was recently used in
a Psychological Review article in which Dalege et al. (2016)
(A)
(B) (C)
Figure 1. Different versions of the tripartite model of attitudes according to Rosenberg and Hovland (1960). (A) Schematic model; (B) Reflective
measurement model. The attitude represents the only latent variable, whereas its manifestations fall into three distinguishable classes of
responses. (C) A reflective measurement model and a behavior-explanation model combined.
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argued against the tripartite model and proposed a new
unrestricted alternative measurement model. As we will
demonstrate in our article, not only can the Campbell Para-
digm be applied to Dalege et al.’s data, but it can also par-
simoniously explain and substantially predict people’s
voting behavior. By contrast, Dalege et al. did not even
attempt to predict voting behavior with their own model.
The technical details of our empirical test (e.g., descriptions
of the sample and the data) can be found in the Appendix.
Examples of attitude measures that more closely fit our
variant of the tripartite model – including behavioral self-
reports and various types of evaluative statements – can
be found in Byrka and Kaiser (2013) and Kaiser, Merten,
and Wetzel (2018).
Measurement Models of Individual
Attitudes
Before turning to the specifics of the Campbell Paradigm,
we will summarize the generic ideas behind Rosenberg
and Hovland’s (1960) tripartite measurement model of (ex-
plicit) attitudes of individuals.
The Tripartite Model of Attitudes: A Latent
Variable Measurement Model
The tripartite model of attitudes is a latent variable model
that is based on the assumption that the latent variable
(i.e., a person’s attitude) elicits three modes or types of
manifestations: a person’s cognitive, affective, and behav-
ioral responses to an attitude object (e.g., a US presidential
candidate, or a Dutch soccer team, say PSV Eindhoven; see
Figure 1A). The latent attitude is in turn expected to be
formed by the attitude object.
To be objectively recognizable, a person’s latent attitude
toward an attitude object (e.g., PSV Eindhoven) must be
displayed as manifest behavior (including all sorts of corpo-
ral reactions). According to the tripartite model, these man-
ifestations can take three generic forms: for example, when
the person verbally states that PSV is the “best” team and
will therefore win the championship (i.e., a cognitive
response), when he/she physically attends a PSV game
(i.e., a behavioral response), and when his/her face erupts
into expressions of joy when PSV scores a goal (i.e., an
affective response). Conceptually, in this model, the atti-
tude (the latent variable) is linked with three types of man-
ifestations (i.e., observable behavior; see Figure 1A).1 More
specifically, the tripartite model can be applied to explain
the occurrence of these manifestations according to the
level of the latent attitude a person embodies.
When the three types of manifestations are regarded as
attitude indicators, the tripartite model can be viewed as
a measurement model for attitudes (see Rosenberg & Hov-
land, 1960). The distinction between indicators and
responses is, however, arbitrary and merely a linguistic
one. In Figure 1B, cognitive, affective, and behavioral man-
ifestations are regarded as indicators of the latent attitude.
To allude to causation between latent attitudes and their
various manifestations, it is common to use arrows to link
latent variables with their manifestations. Typically, such
models are called reflective measurement models (e.g.,
Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000).
When the tripartite model is implemented as a measure-
ment model, a person’s latent attitude toward, say, US pres-
idential candidate X is typically derived from the
respondent’s evaluative statements on questionnaires. As
above, these evaluative reactions can be (a) verbal expres-
sions of one’s cognitive valuation of the attitude object
(e.g., candidate X sets a good example), (b) self-reports of
one’s affective reactions (e.g., X makes me feel proud),
(c) self-reports of one’s behavioral intentions (e.g., I will
vote for X) or of one’s past behavior with respect to the atti-
tude object (e.g., I voted for X), or any combination of these
indicators. Note that the latent attitude can become mani-
fest in many ways and formats, and it is not necessary to
consider them all. Ideally, it should not matter which com-
binations of these indicators are used to measure the under-
lying latent variable (i.e., one’s attitude toward candidate X)
that is believed to control the person’s manifest reactions
(see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Rosenberg & Hovland,
1960). Even the exclusive use of cognitive and affective
indicators would be acceptable.
In the next section, we will describe the Campbell Para-
digm, which we understand might be unfamiliar to some
readers (for more details, see Kaiser et al., 2010). There-
fore, we will describe it in comparatively a bit more detail
than the detail we used for the tripartite model. In our
description of the Campbell Paradigm, we refer to exam-
ples from the environmental-protection domain in which
the paradigm was originally developed.
The Campbell Paradigm
Donald T. Campbell (1963) proposed the original concep-
tual idea that the relative cost of the implementation
(i.e., the difficulty) of a behavior is a decisive element for
1 Note that the tripartite model could – in principle – just as well be understood as a latent attitude causing manifest behavior and two latent
psychological modalities (i.e., cognition and affect). This latter variant differs from the version depicted in Figure 1 but does not affect our
reasoning.
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understanding the relation between a (latent) attitude and a
(manifest) behavior.2 Accordingly and foremost, we can
and should make use of the order (in terms of costs) of
behavior in the measurement of attitudes.
For example, an environmentalist (i.e., a person who
aspires to protect the environment and who, one might
assume, holds a pronounced pro-environmental attitude)
is typically expected to engage in a set of activities that
reflect his or her attitude. For instance, she/he may publicly
acknowledge that climate change is caused by humans,
vote for representatives with a known pro-environmental
record, recycle cardboard regularly, and eliminate foods
that are particularly environmentally harmful (e.g., meat)
from his/her diet. Generally, the person’s esteem for an
attitudinal object (e.g., environmental protection) or goal
(e.g., preserving the environment) becomes obvious in the
extent to which he/she engages in more and more difficult
behaviors that involve increasingly demanding barriers or
progressively more painful sacrifices (i.e., behavioral costs).
Thus, Campbell’s idea is that the cost order of behavior (i.e.,
reactions, indicators, or items) can and should be used as
the basis for the measurement of individual attitudes.
A Measurement Model Grounded in Item Order
Consistent with his suggestion that the order of items
should be seen as paramount to the measurement of atti-
tudes, Campbell (1963) originally proposed the Guttman
(1944) model as the optimum model for measuring atti-
tudes. The Guttman model and its related scalogram
approach have been widely used in the past in psychological
and sociological studies involving domains that are seen as
inherently ordered, such as in cognitive development (e.g.,
Cousins, Siegel, & Maxwell, 1983), cognitive decline (e.g.,
Tractenberg, Yumoto, Aisen, Kaye, & Mislevy, 2012), or
involvement with drugs (e.g., Donovan & Jessor, 1983).
The Guttman model is based on the use of a person-
invariant ordered set of items (I1, I2, . . . Ik) to measure a
latent variable (e.g., Wilson, 2013). This is similar to a math
ability test on which students are asked to solve a set of
increasingly demanding math problems (e.g., addition, mul-
tiplication, integration, etc.). In such a test, the presumption
is that whether or not the students as a whole answer the
items correctly reflects the difficulty of the items. Accord-
ingly, item order means that the relative difficulty or costs
of each behavioral indicator will be approximately the same
across the population. A Guttman ordering can be summa-
rized as thus: If a person affirms a demanding indicator
(e.g., In), then he or she will necessarily affirm all less
demanding indicators (i.e., all Ij with j < n, where it is
assumed that the items are ordered by difficulty) as well.
Vice versa, if a person fails to affirm an undemanding indi-
cator, he or she will not affirm more demanding ones.
Behavioral costs can appear to be rather small, such as
when a person publicly expresses his or her unfavorable
view of a candidate for the US presidency (e.g., Walter
Mondale) by marking a box on a survey. Costs for other
behaviors are obviously more substantial, such as when a
person actively or financially supports a candidate’s cam-
paign (e.g., Ronald Reagan, Mondale’s opponent in the
1984 election). Behavioral costs come in many different
forms, for example, when a behavior involves personal
effort, time, personal sacrifices, or money or when a behav-
ior involves transgressions of social norms, expectations, or
display rules. In a particular sociocultural context (e.g., a
given society), these costs commonly apply to all people
(see e.g., Kaiser & Keller, 2001; Scheuthle, Carabias-Hütter,
& Kaiser, 2005), though this uniformity must be investi-
gated in each particular context (and is typically part of
any Rasch-model test).
On a Campbellian attitude measure, respondents are
challenged by facing a set of increasingly demanding
behavioral indicators, and individual attitudes are indicated
by the maximum number of behavioral costs that a person
is willing to surmount. In other words and according to
Campbell’s proposal, a person’s esteem for an attitudinal
object (e.g., a particular presidential candidate) or goal
(e.g., the election of the particular candidate) becomes clear
in the face of the behavioral costs the person is willing to
endure in order to reveal positivity toward the object in
question or to attain the related goal.
Campbell’s original proposition was successfully tested
with the Guttman model (see Raden, 1977). Nevertheless,
Campbell’s proposition was not picked up again until
recently, perhaps due to the problems inherent to Guttman
scaling, for which a single and perfect discrimination point
is unrealistically assumed to exist between any two attitude
levels (see, e.g., Kofsky, 1966, pp. 202–203), but also
because of an apparent concern about conceptual circular-
ity (see, e.g., Raden, 1977; see also Dawes & Smith, 1985;
Greve, 2001).
Nontrivial Explanation of Behavioral Responses
Deriving an environmental attitude measure from the same
behavioral indicators that are supposed to subsequently be
explained by the attitude would confound the measure. In
other words, if a person’s attitude is estimated through
the behaviors that a person enacts, we cannot really be
surprised to find the very same behaviors explained by this
2 Behavior here refers to any manifest, unequivocally describable, verbal, or nonverbal activity that is observable either with a given scientific
method of investigation (e.g., a mark on a survey or an achievement in an experiment) or in everyday mundane activities, such as attending
soccer games or praising a particular presidential candidate.
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attitude on an empirical test. This is why Campbell’s pro-
posal for measuring individual attitudes was initially
regarded as circular, even by Campbell himself (e.g., Camp-
bell, 1963), and has not been pursued as a model for
explaining behavior. The solution to this conceptual conun-
drum is, as we will demonstrate, the logical and practical
separation of the indicators (i.e., the manifestations used
to estimate the individual level of an attitude) and the con-
sequences of an attitude (e.g., its manifest effects, the criteria
to be explained).
When Kaiser et al. (2010) saw reason to adopt Camp-
bell’s (1963) original idea of using the costs of behavior
as a decisive element in the measurement of attitudes, they
replaced the Guttman model with the Rasch measurement
model (for more details about the Rasch model, see Rasch,
1960/1980; for a recent account, see, e.g., Wilson, 2005).
Note that the argument for interpreting the Rasch family
of models as probabilistic Guttman models has been made
several times in the literature, and hence, we will not make
the case for them here (see, e.g., Wilson, 2013). Whereas
the first part of Kaiser et al.’s (2010) proposal involves view-
ing the tripartite model as a reflective measurement model
– see Figure 1B – the second part involves distinguishing
indicators from consequences.
In contrast to common beliefs about measurement (see,
e.g., De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013),
the behavioral indicators that are used to measure an atti-
tude (e.g., verbal expressions of one’s cognitive and affec-
tive reactions to an attitude object) can be designed to be
different from the behavioral consequences that are modeled
as caused by an attitude (e.g., active behaviors, retrospec-
tive reports of one’s actual behavior or prospective expres-
sions of one’s intention to act in a certain way; see
Figure 1C). Note that in Figure 1C, the indicators are linked
with attitudes by dashed arrows, whereas the consequences
are linked by solid arrows. Thus, the pertinence of particu-
lar responses to an attitude (either as indicator or as conse-
quence) can become empirically recognizable without
circularity concerns.
Within the Campbell Paradigm, estimates of individual
attitudes can be derived from any set of manifest indicators
of an attitude (e.g., evaluative statements about, and affec-
tive reactions to the attitude object, verbal reports about
behavioral intentions, or observations and self-reports of
behavior). It would indeed constitute circular logic if the
behavioral effects – the set of behaviors-to-be-explained –
were included among the indicators that were used to esti-
mate the attitude. However, when there is a logical or a
practical (e.g., a temporal) separation between the indica-
tors and the specific behavioral consequences of an atti-
tude, then there is no logical fallacy. In other words,
measuring attitudes and explaining behavior on the basis of
individual attitudes can be treated as two separate tasks in
the Campbell Paradigm (see, e.g., Byrka, Kaiser, & Olko,
2017; Kaiser & Byrka, 2015; Taube, Kibbe, Vetter, Adler,
& Kaiser, 2018).
Of course, this logical or practical distinction must be
examined in each instance in which the paradigm is used.
In the case of the presidential election data, we will see that
people’s expressions of their intentions to vote for a certain
candidate and their post-election self-reports of voting
behavior are both – at least, logically – distinct from the
same people’s manifest cognitive and affective indicators
of their attitudes.Whereas intentions were, in this case, only
logically distinct – bymeans of itemwording – from the cog-
nitive and affective indicators, the behavioral self-reports
were both logically and temporally distinct from the cogni-
tive and affective indicators of the attitude measure.
The Rasch Model as a Feasible Alternative
Whereas Campbell (1963) originally proposed the deter-
ministic Guttman model as appropriate for attitude mea-
surement, Kaiser et al. (2010) viewed the Guttman model
as unrealistically stringent because it is based on the
assumption that there is no measurement error in the sys-
tem. In concert with other researchers (e.g., Kofsky, 1966;
Wilson, 2011, 2013), Kaiser et al. proposed the probabilistic
models as a solution and the Rasch model as a good way to
model individual attitudes (for similar reasoning in the
domain of intellectual abilities, see Wilson, 2005).
In contrast to the Guttman model, the Rasch model
leaves room for observational irregularities (i.e., measure-
ment error) because, rather than directly modeling a per-
son’s actual engagement in a specific behavior (including
verbal behavior), it models the person’s probability of
engaging in the behavior. In other words, the Rasch model
reduces the goal of applying the measurement model from
predicting people’s engagement in a behavior to predicting
the probability of engaging in a behavior (e.g., verbal behav-
ior on surveys).
For Kaiser et al.’s (2010) formulation of the Campbell
Paradigm for attitude research, it nevertheless remains an
essential commitment to the paradigm to establish the
order of the indicators of an attitude. In the Campbell Para-
digm, however, it is not essential for the indicators from
which an attitude is inferred to be comprised of exclusively
conventional attitude items (i.e., verbal behavior in the
form of expressions of appreciation toward an attitude
object such as “I like X”; see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,
1993). Rather, other verbal acts (e.g., self-reports of behav-
ioral engagement) or observed overt acts can serve as well.
In fact, Byrka and Kaiser (2013) confirmed that tradi-
tional attitude items in the form of verbal expressions of
appreciation, along with straightforward self-reports of atti-
tude-relevant behaviors, can be represented by a single
dimension of evaluative reactions to an attitude object
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(one’s own health in their example) because they represent
a person-invariant ordered set of indicator items (see also
Brügger, Kaiser, & Roczen, 2011, and Kaiser et al., 2018,
for similar results regarding attitude toward nature and atti-
tude toward environmental protection, respectively).
Many attitude measures that apply a Rasch-type model
for the measurement of individual attitudes already exist
in the literature (see, e.g., Howard, Ehrich, & Walton,
2014; Papanastasiou & Schumacker, 2014; Rojas-Tejada,
Lozano-Rojas, Navas-Luque, & Pérez-Moreno, 2011). These
measures are typically justified exclusively on the basis of
the psychometric advantages of the Rasch model (e.g.,
specific objectivity – see, e.g., Rasch, 1977 – which implies
certain aspects of sample-freeness; for a detailed example
and explanation, see Kaiser et al., 2018). In other words,
it is assumed that the measurement model can be chosen
at will, without attending to the concept to be measured
and by ignoring a latent attitude’s presumed theoretical link
to its manifestations.
The Campbell Paradigm, by contrast, represents a mea-
surement model that is grounded in an explicit conceptual
model (a) of the expected relations between the attitude
and various manifestations – the tripartite model of attitudes
– and (b) of the specific connection between each singleman-
ifestation and a corresponding attitude – the Rasch model.
Regarding the latter, the Campbell Paradigm thus speaks
of a generic compensatory relation between a person’s atti-
tude and the costs that are involved in engaging in a behavior
(see, e.g., Kaiser, Arnold, & Otto, 2014; Taube et al., 2018).
In contrast to non-Campbellian attitude measures that
apply Rasch-type models for the measurement of an indi-
vidual attitude (e.g., plagiarism attitudes; see Howard
et al., 2014), attitude measurement with the Campbell
Paradigm thus involves an explicit exploration of the corre-
spondence between the conceptually anticipated and the
empirically identified item order. This occurs when, for
example, we corroborate the idea that self-reporting one’s
compliance is comparatively more demanding on average
than verbally asserting compliance or verbally expressing
approval (see, e.g., Byrka & Kaiser, 2013; Kaiser et al.,
2010). Specifically, the Campbell Paradigm requires that
a conceptually grounded ordering of the items operationally
defines the latent attitude, which in turn must be (approxi-
mately) empirically confirmed by the Rasch-model esti-
mates of the ordering of the indicator items by cost.
Wilson (2005) identified this formal requirement as validity
of the internal structure.
Conceptually Meaningful Item Order
Defining an attitude within the Campbell Paradigm
involves carving out an assemblage of behavioral indicators
and ordering them in terms of their costs. This set of indi-
cators is thought to represent the behaviors people engage
in when implementing their personal levels of a particular
attitude (e.g., toward environmental protection), or stated
somewhat differently, when pursuing a personal attitudinal
goal (e.g., protecting the environment; see Kaiser et al.,
2010). Depending on their personal levels of environmental
attitude, people can wash their laundry in an energy-
efficient way, vote for green political parties, and admit a
certain degree of environmental concern on surveys.
Whereas certain behavioral indicators (e.g., glass and
paper recycling) turn out to be rather undemanding – espe-
cially as self-reports (see, e.g., Geller, 1981) – others (e.g.,
taking public transportation or riding a bicycle to work or
school) will be relatively more demanding but not as chal-
lenging as refraining from owning a car altogether (see, e.g.,
Kaiser, Midden, & Cervinka, 2008).
In the pursuit of a specific attitudinal goal, people are
expected to deliberately and rationally choose from among
several behavioral means that can help them cost-
effectively realize their personal attitudinal goals (e.g., Kai-
ser et al., 2010). Thus, people favor relatively more conve-
nient, socially accepted, and undemanding behaviors over
more strenuous, socially proscribed, and demanding behav-
iors when manifesting their personal levels of a certain atti-
tude. Consequently, the order of the behavioral responses
that individuals use to implement their personal levels of
a particular attitude operationally defines the conceptual
understanding of the specific attitude under scrutiny. In
reverse, the order of the behavioral indicators of a particu-
lar attitude can thus be used to validate a newly developed
measure (see, e.g., Kaiser, 1998).
So far, the Campbell Paradigm has been used to develop
Rasch-model-based attitude measures in various content
domains: attitudes toward environmental protection (i.e.,
environmental attitude), nature (see, e.g., Kaiser, Brügger,
Hartig, Bogner, & Gutscher, 2014; Kaiser et al., 2013), nat-
ure-preservation-related restrictions (see Byrka et al., 2017),
global climate change (see Urban, 2016), health (see Byrka
& Kaiser, 2013), mental vigor (see Beute, Kaiser, Haans, &
de Kort, 2017), and social interaction (see Haans, Kaiser, &
de Kort, 2007).
For illustrative purposes and to demonstrate its generic
potential for attitude measurement beyond the known
application domains, we will now apply the Campbell Para-
digm to an arbitrary example (i.e., the 1984 US presidential
election data) that was recently presented in a Psychological
Review article in which the authors asked researchers to
abandon the tripartite model as the measurement model
for (explicit) attitudes (see Dalege et al., 2016). Note that
this is an illustrative example. Thus, we do not expect a con-
ceptually grounded ordering of the items, which is usually
required in applications of the Campbell Paradigm. Still,
even with such a suboptimally fitting example, the Campbell
Paradigm can nontrivially, parsimoniously, and substantially
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account for people’s voting intentions and behaviors, some-
thing Dalege et al. did not even attempt to do.
The Campbell Paradigm Applied to
the 1984 US Presidential Election
Data
We implemented three goals in this section. First, we tested
our prime hypothesis derived from the Campbell Paradigm
by investigating whether the 44 evaluative reactions to the
two presidential candidates (i.e., Ronald Reagan andWalter
Mondale) could form a person-invariant ordered set of
items that could in fact be used as the basis for a Campbel-
lian measure of pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude. The
resulting one-dimensional Rasch scale represents respon-
dents’ joint expression of their appreciation for Ronald Rea-
gan and their scorn for Walter Mondale.
Second, we tested whether a single attitude dimension
could sufficiently represent all 44 evaluative reactions.
Rather than corroborating only the theoretically anticipated
dimension, we contrasted this one-dimensional Rasch
model with two- and three-dimensional Rasch models to
explore whether the information in the 44 items could be
better represented by a more complex attitudinal model.
Third, we examined the predictive validity of the attitudi-
nal measure that we developed. Here, we accounted for peo-
ple’s intentions to vote for one of the two presidential
candidates prior to the election and predicted their reports
of how they had voted after the election in 1984. Note that,
especially with measures at different levels of aggregation,
such as in this case where attitude is measured with a mul-
ti-item scale and behavior is measured with a single item,
expectations for comprehensive behavioral explanations
(i.e., large effect size) are typically not high (see, e.g., Ajzen
& Fishbein, 2005). In contemporary attitude research, for
optimal correspondence and comprehensive explanations
of behavior, attitude measures and behavior measures are
typically required to be on the same level of measurement
– either both single-item measures or both scales. This prin-
ciple of aggregation has a long-standing tradition in attitude
research (see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). On the basis of
the Campbell Paradigm, however, we would expect an
already fairly comprehensive explanation of people’s voting
intentions prior to the election and a similarly comprehensive
prediction of people’s self-reported voting after the election.
Pro-Reagan-Anti-Mondale Attitude Within
the Campbell Paradigm
Each respondent could express his or her appreciation for
each of the two presidential candidates by means of 44
verbal behaviors: 15 evaluative statements and seven feel-
ings related to each of the given candidates and their
actions. The most straightforward application of the Camp-
bell Paradigm with these 44 items consists of a bipolar atti-
tude measure that ranges from a pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale
sentiment on one end to a pro-Mondale-anti-Reagan senti-
ment on the other end of the scale. Such an attitude mea-
sure jointly captures a favoring of Reagan and a rejection
of Mondale as a single latent behavioral propensity. In other
words, it reflects how a person appreciates Ronald Reagan
and simultaneously holds an unfavorable view of Walter
Mondale. Note that the directionality of the scale is arbi-
trary. A pro-Mondale-anti-Reagan attitude would, of course,
be formally equivalent. Note also that our example scale
includes only cognitive and affective indicators but no
behavioral indicators.
Operational Rasch scales require that the indicator items
from which a person’s attitude level (in our case, the pro-
Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude) is derived represent a single,
person-invariant, and ordered Rasch-homogenous set of
items. This test corresponds to the question of whether
the Rasch model fits the data reasonably well. Moreover,
the extent of a person’s attitude is derived on the basis of
maximum likelihood estimation, which is the conventional
way to score individuals with approaches that are based on
the Rasch model (see, e.g., Embretson & Reise, 2000). The
estimates represent logit scores. Logits stand for the natural
logarithm of the favorable/unfavorable appraisal probabil-
ity ratio across the entire response vector of a person.
The smaller a logit value, the lower the particular person’s
attitude, in this case, the less likely a person will be to
express appreciation for Reagan.
Because our sample of 2,257 respondents was relatively
large, we did not test for the statistical significance of the
mean square (MS) statistic in assessing item fit but used
the effect size interpretation instead (see Wilson, 2005).
The MS statistic reflects the relative discrepancy in varia-
tion between the Rasch model’s predictions and the
observed data, either for individuals or for items. An MS
value of 0.75 corresponds to 25% less than the expected
amount of variation, and an MS value of 1.33 indicates
33% more variation in the data than what was predicted
by the measurement model. MS values in this range are
regarded as a sensible threshold for instruments used in
the scientific exploration of empirical relations (cf. Wright,
Linacre, Gustafson, & Martin-Löf, 1994).
Our Rasch model test by and large revealed a reasonable
statistical fit for our pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale Attitude
scale. The MS fit statistics for the 44 indicator items in
our scale all fell between an MS of 0.79 and an MS of
1.26. The traditional person reliability was replaced by the
separation reliability (Wright & Masters, 1982), which
reflects an estimate of the percentage of true person
2019 Hogrefe Publishing Distributed under the
Hogrefe OpenMind License [CC BY 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)]
European Psychologist (2019), 24(4), 359–374
F. G. Kaiser & M. Wilson, The Campbell Paradigm as a Tripartite Model 365
variance in the measure, which, in this case was rel = .92
(see Table 1).
Pro-Reagan and Pro-Mondale Attitudes
Although our first Rasch model test revealed that the 44
statements about the candidates could be modeled as the
expected pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude within the
Campbell Paradigm, we had yet to determine whether this
single attitude offered a sufficient account of the electorate’s
attitude toward the two candidates as captured by the 44
items. In other words, could these 44 items represent mul-
tiple attitudes toward the two presidential candidates?
Using the multidimensional random coefficients multino-
mial logit (MRCML) model (Adams et al., 1997) – a Rasch-
type model that allows multiple person dimensions to be
modeled simultaneously – we compared models describing
a one-, a two-, and a three-dimensional attitude space. Like
confirmatory factor analysis, the MRCMLmodel allowed us
to test a specific, predicted item-factor structure. In the pre-
sent case, each item was assigned to only one dimension. In
other words, multidimensionality was modeled as existing
solely on the level of the concept and not on the item level,
as is the case with simple structure in a factor analysis.
Whereas the one-dimensional model used all 44 items to
reflect a single attitude toward the two candidates (i.e., a
pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude), the two-dimensional
model used 22 indicators (for each candidate) to reflect each
of two distinct attitudes: one pro-Reagan and one pro-Mon-
dale. By contrast, our three-dimensional model separated
both the pro-Reagan the pro-Mondale attitudes – solely rep-
resented by the 15 evaluative statements about each of the
two candidates – from a “feelings dimension” (i.e., consent-
ing to positive feelings and rejecting negative feelings). The
feeling items were treated as a separate dimension under
the assumption that they reflected some generic response
tendencies (e.g., negative affectivity, a known mood-related
bias in health research; e.g., Watson & Pennebaker, 1989),
not least of all because the feeling items that were employed
represented atypical attitude indicators.
Model fit was estimated with the G2 statistic, which is
roughly w2-distributed (cf. Adams et al., 1997). As can be
seen in Table 1, the overall fit of the two-dimensional
model, G2(47) = 83,032, was significantly better than for
the one-dimensional, G2(45) = 90,312, or three-dimensional
models,3 G2(53) = 87,555, with an increase in model fit of
ΔG2(2) = 7,280 (p < .001) and ΔG2(6) = 4,523 (p < .001),
respectively.
A two-dimensional model that spoke of two separate atti-
tudes (i.e., one toward each of the two candidates) was also
implied by the only moderate correlation between the two
attitudes, which was r = .44 (disattenuated for measure-
ment error). On the one hand, this correlation corroborated
the discriminant validity of the two attitude measures, and
on the other hand, it indicated that a person who valued
Reagan was simultaneously somewhat inclined to denigrate
Mondale and vice versa. Separating the two attitudes did
not necessarily have much relevance though, unless it could
expand our understanding of people’s voting behavior.
Explaining the Intention to Vote and
Predicting Self-Reported Voting
In order to check whether attitude did indeed have an influ-
ence on a person’s intention to vote and on self-reported
voting behavior, we used Mplus (Muthén & Muthén,
2011) to estimate a more complex model. Specifically, we
estimated the models shown in Figures 2A and 2B, in which
we simultaneously estimated regressions of two binary out-
comes on the latent variable(s). These models, which com-
bine measurement and prediction, allowed us to account
for measurement error in the latent variables.
First, we discuss the results of the two-dimensional atti-
tude model (Figure 2B). We used each person’s pro-Reagan
and pro-Mondale attitudes to explain his or her intention to
vote for Ronald Reagan (1) or Walter Mondale (0) before
the election (N = 1,950) and to predict his or her self-
reported actual vote for Ronald Reagan (1) or Walter Mon-
dale (0) after the election (N = 1,376).
Jointly, the pro-Reagan and pro-Mondale attitudes
accounted for 78.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of voting intentions
and 74.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of actual voting behavior. Know-
ing people’s attitudes toward the two candidates raised the
Table 1. Exploration of the dimensionality of the attitude-toward-the-
two-candidates items
Model G2 npar rD1-D2 relD1 relD2 relD3
1D: pro-R-anti-M 90,311.86 45 – .92 – –
2D: pro-R & pro-M 83,032.13 47 .44 .91 .88 –
3D: 2 D & Feeling 87,555.12 53 .31 .87 .79 .64
Notes. G2 stands for the model fit statistic (its deviance), which is a log-
likelihood statistic multiplied by 2 (see Adams, Wilson, & Wang, 1997).
Differences in deviances are generally assumed to have a w2-distribution
with the difference in the number of parameters (npar) as degrees of
freedom. Thus, we can statistically compare model fits of, for example, the
less restricted two-dimensional (2D) model with the simpler one-dimen-
sional (1D) model. Note that superior fit shows in smaller deviances. rD1-D2
= correlation between Dimension 1 and Dimension 2; rel = reliability esti-
mates for Dimensions 1, 2, or 3. The correlations are estimates that have
been disattenuated for measurement error (for technical details, see
Adams et al., 1998).
3 Note that we actually fit four different three-dimensional models using different codings (either rejecting or accepting both positive and negative
feelings, and two other variants), but the one shown had the best fit.
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(A)
(B)
Figure 2. Depictions of two possible measurement/predictive models of attitudes toward the two candidates in the 1984 US presidential election.
The number of affective and cognitive indicators (i.e., items) in this figure is lower than in the actual analyses for ease of presentation. The
behavioral consequences of an attitude in this case are (i) the retrospective report of one’s actual vote for Reagan and (ii) the prospectively
expressed intention to vote for Reagan. Dashed arrows specify indication. Solid arrows specify prediction. The double-headed arrow represents a
correlation. (A) One-dimensional model; (B) Two-dimensional model.
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probability of correctly recognizing individuals with an
intention to vote for Reagan from p = .58 to p = .90 and
for correctly discriminating a Reagan from a Mondale
voter from p = .58 to p = .88. The base rate (p = .58) was
obviously already slightly in favor of Reagan in the sur-
veyed sample.
For every logit increase in a person’s pro-Reagan attitude,
the odds of expressing the intention to vote for Reagan
increased by a factor of 14 (p < .001). For every logit
increase in a person’s pro-Reagan attitude, the odds of actu-
ally voting for Reagan increased by a factor of 6.4 (p <
.001).
For every logit increase in a person’s pro-Mondale atti-
tude, the odds of expressing the intention to vote for Reagan
decreased by a factor of 7.7 (p < .001). For every logit
increase in a person’s pro-Mondale score, the odds of actu-
ally voting for Reagan decreased by a factor of 4.2 (p < .001).
Those who were above the mean on the pro-Reagan
dimension (compared to those who were below the mean)
were 4.6 times more likely to express their intention to vote
for Reagan rather than Mondale (p < .001). They were also
about 4.3 times more likely (again compared to those who
were below the mean) to actually vote for Reagan rather
than Mondale (p < .001).
Those who were above the mean on the pro-Mondale
dimension (compared to those below the mean) were about
5.7 times more likely to express their intention to vote for
Mondale rather than Reagan (p < .001). They were also
5.5 times more likely (again compared to those below the
mean) to actually vote for Mondale rather than Reagan
(p < .001).
Now, consider the model in Figure 2A. The findings just
reported deteriorated marginally when the pro-Reagan-
anti-Mondale attitude – instead of the separate pro-Reagan
and pro-Mondale attitudes – was used as the sole predictor
in the two regression analyses. The pro-Reagan-anti-Mon-
dale attitude alone accounted for 77.2% (Nagelkerke R2)
of voting intentions and for 72.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of actual
voting behavior. Knowing people’s attitudes toward the two
candidates raised the probability of correctly recognizing
individuals with an intention to vote for Reagan from p =
.58 to p = .90 and for correctly discriminating a Reagan
from a Mondale voter from p = .58 to p = .87.
For every logit increase in a person’s pro-Reagan-anti-
Mondale attitude, the odds of expressing the intention to
vote for Reagan increased by a factor of 290 (p < .001).
For every logit increase in a person’s pro-Reagan-anti-Mon-
dale score, the odds of actually voting for Reagan increased
by a factor of 52 (p < .001).
Those who were above the mean on the unidimensional
pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude (compared to those who
were below the mean) were 6.7 times more likely to express
their intention to vote for Reagan rather than Mondale
(p < .001). They were also about 6.3 times more likely
(again compared to those below the mean) to actually vote
for Reagan rather than Mondale (p < .001).
Whereas the quantitative gains relative to the one-dimen-
sional view might not be sufficient to justify the more
sophisticated, two-dimensional view of people’s attitudes
toward the two presidential candidates, the explanation
for why someone chose to vote for Reagan or Mondale
might. As expected, Reagan voters had positive views of
their candidate and negative views of the challenger, and
Mondale voters had positive views of their candidate and
negative views of Reagan, as shown in Figure 3. This figure
shows that Reagan and Mondale voters had comparable –
in magnitude – positive attitudes toward the preferred can-
didate, but Mondale voters were significantly more nega-
tive than Reagan voters about the opponent. Also,
consistent with Figure 3, the two sets of performance crite-
ria – intention to vote prior to the election and self-reported
voting after the election – were substantially correlated (φ =
.91, N = 1,269). Even the means for the two attitudes for
people who expressed an intention to vote for or who
reported voting for either Reagan or Mondale were not sig-
nificantly different and were thus comparable, which can
be seen in the overlapping 95% confidence intervals in Fig-
ure 3 (see Cumming & Finch, 2005). Thus, in the following,
we focused exclusively on people’s post-election self-
reported voting, predicted by the attitudes toward the two
candidates assessed prior to the election.
Measuring a single pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude
would have obscured the fact that people based their deci-
sion about which of the two candidates to vote for on two
relatively distinct but correlated (r = .44; see Table 1) rea-
sons. Some chose Reagan because they valued him, others
because they disliked the challenger (i.e., Mondale), and
still others due to a combination of pro-Reagan and
anti-Mondale sentiments. A one-dimensional, bipolar pro-
Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude, by contrast, would have sug-
gested that the electorate formed only one single attitude
toward the two candidates in which a favorable view of
one candidate was automatically counterbalanced by an
unfavorable view of the other. For example, if appreciation
for Reagan had increased, people’s valuation of Mondale
would automatically have been lowered by the same
amount. However, this compensatory view, which is consis-
tent with a bipolar view of people’s attitudes, was compro-
mised by the less-than-perfect negative correlation between
the two attitudes.
In other words, a single bipolar pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale
attitude would have implied that people tended to form one
single view of both candidates jointly in which a favorable
view of one candidate was compensated for by an unfavor-
able view of the other. In this case, people would obviously
not have formed two more or less separate attitudes toward
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the two candidates. A bipolar pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale
attitude, in contrast to two separate pro-Reagan and pro-
Mondale attitudes, would also have implied that a presiden-
tial campaign could theoretically be exclusively positive
about one candidate or exclusively negative about his oppo-
nent. There was nothing to gain from being positive about
Reagan and negative about his opponent, Mondale. Both
would at most result in a quantitative shift toward the
pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale end and away from the pro-Mon-
dale-anti-Reagan end of the scale. But with two imperfectly
correlated attitudes, we can and must tell a different story.
The finding of two imperfectly correlated attitudes is
consistent with the idea that presidential campaigns are
won not only by stressing the positive aspects of one’s
own candidate but also by stressing the flaws of the candi-
date’s opponent. This is, because some people seem to
respond to the former and others to the latter. These two
strategies for influencing the electorate correspond with
people’s experiences with presidential election campaigns.
A two-dimensional attitude model reflects these two strate-
gies and presents them as reasonable.
Conclusion
Following the lead of researchers such as Krantz, Luce,
Suppes, and Tversky (1971), Michell (1999), and Rasch
(1960/1980, 1977), we believe one key to a successful
empirical science of behavior is the proper measurement
of its core constructs. In this article, we demonstrated that
the Campbell Paradigm – and, thus, its two parameters: the
costs of implementing a particular behavior and the extent
of an individual’s attitude – can be applied to Dalege et al.’s
(2016) data to measure people’s pro-Reagan and anti-
Mondale attitudes. Even in the context of Reagan versus
Mondale, item order is apparently informative. The more
pronounced a person’s pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude,
the more behavioral costs (in the form of, e.g., risk of social
depreciation) the person will accept in order to endorse
Ronald Reagan or reject Walter Mondale.
This is not to say that our specific results represent a mat-
ter that is free from controversy. It remains arguable
whether political attitudes toward presidential candidates
should be conceptualized as a system of two oblique atti-
tudes or as a single bipolar attitude. From a technical point
of view, two distinct attitudes (i.e., a pro-Reagan attitude
and a pro-Mondale attitude) were barely superior to a single
bipolar pro-Reagan-anti-Mondale attitude in accounting for
people’s voting intentions and self-reported voting.
As predicted, we found that quantitative knowledge
about the extent to which a person was dedicated to
Reagan-electing or Mondale-rejecting goals (their pro-
Reagan-anti-Mondale attitudes) substantially increased the
probability of approximately p = .60 to a probability of
Figure 3. Mean voter attitude, measured as either pro-Reagan or pro-Mondale attitudes, of people who intended to vote and actually voted for
either Reagan or Mondale in the 1984 presidential election.
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around p = .90 for predicting a person’s voting intentions
and his or her self-reported past voting for Reagan.
As a measurement model, the tripartite model describes
the link between a latent attitude and some manifest eval-
uative statements – affective, cognitive, and behavioral
responses – toward an attitude object (see Figure 1B). It pro-
vides a parsimonious account of individual attitudes. As a
latent variable measurement model grounded in item
order, the Campbell Paradigm represents a highly restricted
version of the tripartite model that can be empirically tested
and can actually fail (see Wilson, 2013). However, the ulti-
mate criterion for any theory in behavioral science is its
ability to account for manifest behavior – beyond verbal
behavior.
Thus, next to its use as a measurement model for individ-
ual attitudes, the Campbell Paradigm also provides a theo-
retical account of any attitude-relevant individual behavior
(including verbal behavior on questionnaires; see Kaiser
et al., 2010). As we argue, the samemodel used to establish
an estimation of the latent attitude is expected to also
theoretically account for other forms of attitude-relevant
behavior (see Figure 1C). This is in obvious contrast to
some traditional practices and notions in social psychology.
For example, in the theory of planned behavior (e.g.,
Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), the model for the measurement
of its concepts is a rational-choice-based expectancy-value
model (see, e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and is as such
quite different from the planned behavior model that is
used to explain behavior (see, e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980). In the theory of planned behavior (i.e., the behav-
ior-explanation model), attitude is typically one of three
factors reflecting behavioral intention and behavior (the
others being perceived behavioral control and subjective
norms), not to mention the fact that in the theory of
planned behavior, the principle of aggregation is usually
mandatory. This means that attitude and behavior must
be measured on the same level of aggregation, either as
general or as specific measures. In other words, predicting
a specific, single-item measure of voting behavior with a
general, multi-item measure of a person’s pro-Reagan-
anti-Mondale attitude would be expected to fail (see, e.g.,
Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005).
As a theoretical account of individual behavior, the
Campbell Paradigm anticipates two compensatorily effec-
tive determinants of any manifest verbal or nonverbal
behavior: the costs of implementing (i.e., the difficulty of)
a particular behavior and the extent of an individual’s atti-
tude (Kaiser, Arnold, et al., 2014). Not surprisingly, Arnold
(2017) and Kibbe (2017) corroborated the compensatory
effectiveness of behavioral costs and of individuals’ atti-
tudes for attitude-relevant manifest behavior that was not
already used to measure the attitude in question (see also
Arnold & Kaiser, 2018; Byrka et al., 2017; Kaiser & Byrka,
2015; Taube et al., 2018).
As a measurement model, the Campbell Paradigm for-
mally describes the relation between a latent concept (e.
g., individual attitude) and manifest behavior (including
verbal behavior on a questionnaire). As a behavior-explana-
tion model, the Campbell Paradigm uses the quantitative
estimate (i.e., the measure) of the latent attitude to explain
the occurrence of the behavior in question. Still, when mea-
surement – linking manifest behavioral indicators with indi-
vidual attitudes – and explanation – predicting behavior
with a latent attitude (see Figure 1C) – are treated as two
logically and practically separate tasks that involve distinct
behaviors, there is no logical fallacy to be caught in (cf. e.g.,
De Houwer et al., 2013). In other words, the circularity
problem is avoided by separating the to-be-explained
behavior from the behavioral indicators of an attitude
(see Figure 1C).
With our research, we implemented the Campbell Para-
digm as a reinterpretation of the tripartite model with data
that were previously employed by Dalege et al. (2016).
Even though such data are typical in attitude research, they
were somewhat suboptimal for the Campbell Paradigm
because the cost order of the verbal responses to the attitu-
dinal objects – the two presidential candidates – could have
been wider (for better examples, see, Byrka & Kaiser, 2013;
Kaiser et al., 2018). With data that are better suited to fit a
less restrictive measurement model than the Campbell
Paradigm (see Dalege et al., 2016), we meant to demon-
strate that, solely by including behavioral costs – with the
Campbell Paradigm as the measurement model – the tripar-
tite model can overcome its claimed weakness and account
for all sorts of behavior.
We believe that Kaiser et al.’s (2010) Campbell Paradigm
represents a highly restricted, sensible, and workable
version of the traditional tripartite model and, thus, of a
latent variable measurement model for (explicit) attitudes.
As such, it (a) does not propose unverifiable causality
between an attitude and the corresponding evaluative reac-
tions, and it (b) does not propose this between an attitude
object and an attitude either (see Figure 1A). In addition,
the Campbell Paradigm (c) allows all types of behavioral
reactions to be included (not only verbal behavior) when
individual attitudes are measured as a latent variable (see
Figure 1B), and it (d) allows unambiguous nontrivial predic-
tions of behavior to be made as in the case of self-reported
voting behavior (see Figure 1C). Most remarkable and in
contrast to the state of affairs in social psychology, the
Campbell Paradigm has the potential to help researchers
rediscover actual behavior as the target for the science of
behavior (e.g., see Kaiser & Byrka, 2015; Taube et al.,
2018).
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Appendix
Participants and Procedures
In the 1984 American National Election Study (ANES), the
pre-election sample (N = 2,257; response rate: 72.1%) was
randomly assigned to either face-to-face or telephone inter-
views. Of this pre-election sample, 1,989 respondents
(response rate: 88.1%) were again surveyed in the post-elec-
tion interview (again face-to-face or over the telephone). The
pre-election interviews (averaging 76 min) were all con-
ducted before the November 6 election (starting September
4). The post-election interviews (averaging 46 min) were all
conducted before January 25, 1985 (starting November 7,
1984).
Data and Items
The data were made available by the Inter-University Con-
sortium for Political and Social Research and initially col-
lected by the Center for Political Studies in the Institute of
Social Research at the University of Michigan for the
national election studies, under the overall direction of War-
ren E. Miller; Santa Traugott was director of studies in 1984.
The data were collected under a grant from the National
Science Foundation. Neither the collector of the original
data nor the consortium bears any responsibility for the
analyses or interpretations presented here.
There were 15 evaluative statements tapping beliefs and
seven tapping feelings about each of the two presidential
candidates, and these were all handled in the same way as
in Dalege et al. (2016). Beliefs were assessed by asking ques-
tions such as “In your opinion, does the phrase hard-working
describe the candidate extremely well, quite well, not too
well, not well at all?” The term candidate was replaced by
either Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale (and thus, there
were 30 belief questions altogether, half related to each can-
didate), and hard-working was one of 15 attributes used to
describe the candidates. The other 14 attributes were: (1)
moral, (2) knowledgeable, (3) inspiring, (4) providing strong
leadership, (5) decent, (6) compassionate, (7) commanding
respect, (8) intelligent, (9) kind, (10) setting a good example,
(11) really caring about people like you, (12) understanding
people like you, (13) fair, and (14) in touch with ordinary peo-
ple. Responses were coded 1 (= not well at all) to 4 (= ex-
tremely well). As Dalege et al. did, we also collapsed and
recoded responses 1 and 2 to 0 (representing an unfavorable
response) and 3 and 4 to 1 (representing a favorable
response).
Feelings were assessed by asking “Has the candidate (be-
cause of the kind of person he is or because of something
he has done) ever made you feel angry?” The term candi-
date was again replaced by either Ronald Reagan or Walter
Mondale (and thus, there were 14 feeling questions alto-
gether, half related to each candidate), and angry was one
of seven feelings attributed to the candidate or his actions.
The other six feelings were: (1) hopeful, (2) afraid of him, (3)
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proud, (4) disgusted, (5) sympathetic toward him, and (6)
uneasy. Response options were yes and no. Whereas the
yes responses to positive feelings (#1, #3, #5) were coded
1, the no responses were coded 0. The coding was reversed
for negative feelings: yes responses were coded 0, and no
responses were coded 1. In this way, 1 again reflected a
favorable and 0 an unfavorable assessment.
In contrast to Dalege et al. (2016), there was no need for
us to decide whether to apply a casewise or listwise deletion
procedure or to decide how to deal with missing values.
This is because the missing values could be accommodated
by the Marginal Maximum Likelihood estimation proce-
dure that we applied as the Rasch model estimation proce-
dure used in the ConQuest software (Adams et al., 1998).
We estimated individual attitude levels as “plausible val-
ues,”4 which allowed us to come up with a person score
even when there was no variance in a person response vec-
tor (e.g., when all items were favorable or unfavorable).
This is why we had attitude measures for all persons in
the data set (N = 2,257), which was more than what Dalege
et al. reported (N = 1,877 for attitude toward Ronald Rea-
gan; N = 1,628 for attitude toward Walter Mondale). Note
as well that we repeated all analyses described in this article
with the 1,877 individuals who had complete data vectors for
the Reagan-related reactions (i.e., containing no missing val-
ues) and the 1,628 individuals who had complete data vec-
tors for the Mondale-related reactions. With this reduced
dataset, we found basically the same results with no notable
differences.
Results
In Figure 3, the y-axis is the logit scale from the two-dimen-
sional model, dimensions being pro-Reagan (dark gray)
and pro-Mondale (light gray) attitudes. These two mea-
sures are in a common metric (after ensuring that items
measuring these two attitudes have the same mean and
variance).
The graph on the left (intention) represents the pro-Rea-
gan (dark gray) and pro-Mondale (light gray) attitudes of
those who expressed their intention to vote for Reagan (first
bar from the left) and of those who intended to vote for
Mondale (second bar from the left). Those who expressed
their intention to vote for Reagan had a mean pro-Reagan
attitude estimate of 1.36 and a mean pro-Mondale (rather
an anti-Mondale) attitude estimate of 0.85. Those who
expressed their intention to vote for Mondale had a mean
pro-Reagan (again, rather an anti-Reagan) attitude estimate
of 1.88 and a mean pro-Mondale attitude estimate of 1.30.
The graph on the right (voting) represents the pro-Rea-
gan (dark gray) and pro-Mondale (light gray) attitudes of
those who voted for Reagan (third bar from the left) and
of those who voted for Mondale (fourth bar from the left).
Those who voted for Reagan had a mean pro-Reagan atti-
tude estimate of 1.43 and a mean anti-Mondale attitude
estimate of 0.88. Those who voted for Mondale had a
mean anti-Reagan attitude estimate of 1.80 and a mean
pro-Mondale attitude estimate of 1.20.
Consider Figure 3 regarding intentions. We will inter-
pret all four means (1.36, 0.85, 1.30, and 1.88) as the
extent of or “intensities” in their respective attitudes. Statis-
tically significant differences (at p = .01) between any two of
these four means can be seen in nonoverlapping 95% confi-
dence intervals (see Cumming & Finch, 2005).
Remarkably, those who intended to vote for Reagan had
a pro-Reagan attitude that was higher in absolute (ignoring
the sign) “intensity” (i.e., |1.36|) compared with the “inten-
sity” of their anti-Mondale sentiment (i.e., |0.85|). By con-
trast, those who intended to vote for Mondale had a pro-
Mondale attitude that was lower in “intensity” (i.e., |1.30|)
compared with the “intensity” of their anti-Reagan senti-
ment (i.e., |1.88|).
The difference in relative “intensity” in the pro-Mondale
and anti-Reagan attitudes of those who intended to vote for
Mondale (1.30  (1.88) = 3.18) was much larger than the
difference in “intensity” in the pro-Reagan and anti-Mon-
dale attitudes of those who intended to vote for Reagan
(1.36  (0.85) = 2.21). This pattern of findings about a
person’s intention to vote for either Reagan or Mondale
was fully reflected in the findings about voting for either
Reagan or Mondale.
One interpretation of this might be that those who
intended to vote (or voted) for Mondale might have
expressed their intention or actually voted for Mondale
not because of their appreciation for him but because of
their extreme disdain for Reagan (because of their high
anti-Reagan sentiment at 1.88 and 1.80). In turn, those
who intended to vote (or voted) for Reagan might not have
been too anti-Mondale because their anti-Mondale senti-
ment was substantially lower (at 0.85 and 0.88).
4 Plausible values are derived for each person as a random draw from the estimated distribution of the Rasch-model-based estimates of
individuals with similar patterns of item responses. These estimates reflect the empirically established measurement accuracy of an attitude
scale (for methodological details, see, e.g., Mislevy, 1991; for computational details, see Adams et al., 1998).
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